History is not only made by societies, but it also makes and transforms societies. A sudden historical change may completely alter or reshape individual or societal well-being. At first, people may not be aware of the seriousness of the historical change emerging around and surrounding them. As long as they don’t confront directly with problems, they may not realize “What maintains or destroys their individual or societal well-being?” There may be a lot of parameters to be considered to answer this question. A more holistic approach can be taken with the word “conjuncture” which implies the juxtaposition of all the circumstances experienced by different societies within the national/international politics and social institutions.

In the last decade of the twentieth century after the breakup of Yugoslavia; Bosnians, Croats and Albanians were exterminated for the sake of Serbian irredentist nationalism, however so called peace makers just watched for a long time and hesitated intervening and ending the extermination. They watched the process as if it was an ordinary practice of the natural life running in its daily routine. However it was not an earthquake, tsunami or any other forms of natural disasters. Although it is very late, fresh news about the genocide in Srebrenica after two decades later is that Radovan Karadzic called as the “Butcher of Bosnia” was found responsible for the genocide and sentenced to 40-year imprisonment.

Wiretaps allegedly featuring phone conversations between Prime Minister (PM) Erdoğan and his son were leaked on February 24, 2014. The recordings provided material for everyday jokes in Turkey. Focusing on the dramatic aspects of the corruption scandal will be a grave mistake. This significant event has provided a historic opportunity for the citizenry of Turkey. People of Turkey are now rendered receptive more than ever for challenging the middle class rhetoric which is accompanied by a strong discourse of ethics. Both must be deconstructed by pointing at ways the middle class discourse is embedded in the capitalist order of things.

Today the group of televisions and newspapers which define themselves as conservative are more puritan, aggressive and dishonest. Now many people who write in newspapers or appear on TV shows take action with the voice of the Prime Minister just like they did in the past with the whistle of a soldier.

Galatasaray University professor of economics Ahmet İnsel says plans by social engineers in Turkey have always backfired. Referring to the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup and its aftermath, İnsel said the regime depended on a spread of nationalism and conservatism promoted as moderate Islam to combat leftist movements in Turkey.

As of January 21, 2009, 28,000 citizens of the Republic of Turkey had signed this statement. Joining in this entirely personal undertaking, listening to the voice of their own consciences, assessing the situation for themselves, persons have signed and continue to sign this “apology” text.

Plus qu’une position idéologique parmi d’autres, le nationalisme est la matrice de toute la pensée politique turque contemporaine. La gauche comme la droite, les Turcs comme les Kurdes, les laïcistes comme les islamistes revendiquent haut et fort leur adhésion aux principes nationalistes. Et cela n’a rien de surprenant tant l’idéologie officielle de l’Etat –le nationalisme d’Atatürk- s’impose à tous les acteurs politiques et pétrit, depuis des décennies, l’imaginaire social et politique du pays.

The concept that best describes the regime in Turkey is praetorian republic. In a praetorian republic, the state may be a disorderly, anarchic power tool of a less than professional army marching behind adventurous chiefs as seen in Latin America in the past. The most significant example to these kinds of praetorian states is the last period of the Roman Empire.

In recent Turkish history, there is a significant difference when the 6-7 September events are compared to other similar ones. These events form another link in the chain of operations such as the Armenian deportation, the scaring off of other minorities, the population exchange with Greece, the scaring off campaign against the Jews in Thrace in 1934, and the wealth tax [raised especially from minorities] all of which were undertaken to Turkify Turkey.

A series of demonstrations shook Turkey with an unprecedented force, resulting in early elections scheduled to take place in July 22nd, 2007. These were the largest demonstrations of the country’s modern history. Furthermore, they were organized by women, presented by women, and mostly attended by women. Not many women in the world could gather such a political power, even triggering a process that brings a government down.

Spricht man über türkische Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union, dann im Schatten eines Ungeheuers „fanatischer Islam“. Reduziert man dagegen die türkische Identität und ihre „Mission“ auf den gänzlich „anderen“ Islam, sprich: den säkularisierten, „moderaten“ und „toleranten“ Islam, so reproduziert man nichts anderes als das selbe Klischee – nur von der anderen Seite betrachtet.

Der türkische Fundamentalismus (1) ist eigentlich ein auf ständiger Existenzangst und empfundener Bedrohung basierender Nationalismus; wobei der Autoritarismus, symbolisiert durch das 1982 grundgesetzlich verankerte Prinzip des „heiligen türkischen Staates“, eine demokratische Souveränität im Sinne einer staatsbürgerlich bestimmten Besetzung des Nationalen ausschließt.

Le 3 octobre 2005, l’Union Européenne a décidé d’ouvrir les négociations en vue de l’adhésion avec la Turquie. En réalité la décision était déjà prise quelques mois auparavant, le 17 décembre 2004, durant le sommet européen. Les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de l’UE demandaient à la Turquie la réalisation de quelques réformes supplémentaires jusqu’au 3 octobre et la signature du protocole annexe de l’Union douanière avec les nouveaux pays membres dont la République de Chypre. Le 3 octobre aurait dû être une date cérémoniale.

I he parliament that emerged from the gen¬eral elections on November 3, 2002, in Turkey has created an unexpected possibility of exit from the authoritarian regime established after the military coup of September 12, 1980.1 The 1982 Constitution, to which I will refer as the September 12 regime, aimed to impose on the society an authoritarian and conservative statist conception of politics.

October 29, 1995, Republic Day; Istanbul, the center of the celebrations and the scene for an "olympiad" of Turkish nationalism. In line with the Olympic creed, ‘‘The most important thing is not to win but to take part,’’ all existing types of nationalism were present: under the umbrella of the governorship's organization (or ‘‘impresarioship’’) and to the familiar strains of the Tenth-Year March, the nationalism of the state.